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THE NON-STATIONARITY OF MONEY AND
PRICES IN INTERDEPENDENT ECONOMIES
Joseph P. Daniels

Economics, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI

David D. VanHoose

University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL

Abstract

In most nations, paths of monetary aggregates and prices consistently depart from stationary trends.
This paper shows that this is a fundamental implication when monetary authorities of interdependent
countries seek to smooth their home output and prices in the presence of incomplete world outputmarket integration and structural asymmetries. Using a two-country model with interdependent
output supply schedules, we show that this conclusion holds whether the exchange rate floats or is
fixed. It also holds if monetary policies are coordinated. Therefore, optimal monetary policy choices by
central banks yield stationary paths for money and prices only under very specific conditions.

1. Introduction

Why do central banks conduct monetary policies that produce base drift--nonstationary growth of the
monetary base and other monetary aggregates? Why do they conduct policies that yield nonstationary
paths for prices as well? As discussed by Goodfriend (1991) and Walsh (1990), considerable research
has been directed toward answering these two questions. Walsh (1986) originally showed that
permanent shifts in money demand may justify base drift as an optimal policy but did not provide an
explanation for price-level non-trend-stationarities. Goodfriend (1987) motivated both base drift and
nonstationary prices as natural results of monetary policy processes aimed at smoothing interest rates
as well as broader objectives relating to output and price stability. Barro (1989) and Froyen and Waud
(1995) have found evidence supporting Goodfriend's hypothesis for some periods in the United States.
In addition, Hetzel (1995) has extended Goodfriend's framework to account for the widespread
observation of "bygones" base drift, in which increases in money and prices caused by transitory
disturbances lead to permanently higher paths for these variables.
As pointed out by VanHoose (1989), however, nonstationary paths for money and prices ultimately
arise from a shortage of instruments relative to the full menu of policy objectives. His analysis, for
instance, demonstrated that base drift and price-level non-trend-stationarity would emerge in settings
in which central banks seek either to aim directly at target values for monetary aggregates or to
minimize deviations of monetary aggregates from such targets. In either instance, the additional policy
objectives create an instrument shortage comparable to that in Goodfriend's interest-rate-smoothing
environment. Sephton (1989) made an analogous point by showing that a central bank concerned with
smoothing the exchange rate in addition to prices also finds nonstationary money and price paths
optimal.
More recently, Daniels and VanHoose (1995) have shown that a similar result can arise from structural
and policy interdependence among economies. Their analysis demonstrates that central bank efforts
to smooth both home output prices and consumer price indexes (CPIs) is sufficient to induce the
optimality of base drift and price-level non-trend-stationarities even in the absence of central bank
desires to limit variability of interest rates, monetary aggregates, or exchange rates. Nevertheless, the
reasoning behind this conclusion again is the problem of a shortfall in the number of independent
instruments relative to the overall number of central bank objectives. Daniels and VanHoose show that
one way that this shortfall might be overcome is for one nation's central bank to condition its
monetary policies on unexpected changes in the money stock in the other country. This essentially
adds an additional independent instrument to the central bank's arsenal, thereby permitting the
central bank to produce stationary money and price paths. They find, however, that with integrated
financial markets, conditioning monetary policies on exchange rate innovations or on innovations in
the other nation's interest rate fails to overcome the instrument shortfall if a nation's central bank
already conditions its policies on the home interest rate.
This paper makes several additional contributions to our understanding of how international
interdependence affects the stationarity of money and prices. The paper generalizes earlier
approaches in the literature on optimal monetary policy in interdependent economies by allowing for
interdependence of output supply behavior across countries. In our model, such interdependence
arises in the context of an environment in which workers who consume goods of two nations desire to

index their nominal wages to unanticipated changes in consumer prices, so that aggregate supply in
each nation ultimately responds to prediction errors concerning home prices, foreign prices, and the
exchange rate. Additionally, we generalize the results of Daniels and VanHoose, who considered a
flexible-exchange-rate setting without any cross-country aggregate supply spillovers. Here, we consider
both flexible- and fixed-exchange-rate regimes and account for supply-side interdependence. We also
isolate special cases in which optimal monetary policies can yield stationary money and price paths in
the presence of aggregate supply interdependence. Furthermore, we analyze whether coordinating
monetary policy choices leads to stationary paths for money and prices.
Our key results are as follows. We find that as long as central banks in interdependent economies are
interested in smoothing unanticipated and anticipated changes in price components in order to reduce
output volatility and save agents the costs of indexing nominal contracts, their optimal policy choices
entail non-stationarity of money and prices under pegged or floating exchange rates. A further
implication of our analysis of the fixed-exchange-rate case is that trend stationarity is a relevant policy
issue for central banks even if the exchange rate is pegged contemporaneously. In addition, we find
that the "bygones" base drift that has predominated in modern economies often emerges as part of
the optimal monetary policy mix for interdependent economies. Finally, we demonstrate that central
bank coordination of monetary policy generally fails to yield stationary paths for money and prices if
financial markets are integrated. Consequently, monetary policy coordination has no benefits as far as
achieving stationarity is concerned.
We are able to identify only two special cases in which trend-stationary monetary policies are optimal.
A situation in which producing stationary paths for money and prices is an optimal policy is one in
which world output markets are fully integrated, so that central banks are interested only in smoothing
their nations' CPIs. Alternatively, central banks that pursue both output and CPI-inflation smoothing
policies will find that monetary and price-level stationarity is the optimal policy if their countries are
identical and experience common disturbances. In the presence of imperfectly integrated output
markets and/or country-specific shocks, however, base drift and non-trend-stationary prices always
emerge as the optimal monetary policies.

2. The Model and Its Solution with a Flexible Exchange Rate and Noncoordinated Monetary Policies

The model below is based on the framework developed in Daniels and VanHoose, which in turn is a
melding of the two-country models of Turnovsky et al. (1988) and Turnovsky and d'Orey (1989) and the
monetary policy framework of Goodfriend (1987). The structural relationships for the model are as
follows:
(1a) 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 ); 1⁄2 < 𝛼𝛼 < 1,
(1b) 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ + (1 – 𝛼𝛼)(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 ),

(2a) 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝑑𝑑1 [𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 – (𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 + 1 – 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 )] + 𝑑𝑑2 (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 ) + 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 ; 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 1; 𝑑𝑑1 , 𝑑𝑑2 ≥ 0,
(2b) 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 – 𝑑𝑑1 [𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∗ − (𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗+ 1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ )]– 𝑑𝑑2 (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 – 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 ) + 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡∗ ,

(3a) 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 – 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 – 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 ; 𝑏𝑏 ≥ 0,

(3b) 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡∗ ,
(4) 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 1 – 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 ,

(5a) 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎(1 – 𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾)(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 – 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 ) – 𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛾𝛾(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ ) − 𝑎𝑎 (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛾𝛾 (𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 – 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 ) =
𝑎𝑎[(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 – 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 −1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 )– 𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 – 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 )]; 𝑎𝑎 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ 𝛾𝛾 ≤ 1,

(5b) 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝑎𝑎(1 – 𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾)(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ ) – 𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝛼𝛼) 𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 – 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 ) + 𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝛼𝛼) 𝛾𝛾 (𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 – 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 ) =
𝑎𝑎(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ ) – 𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ )],
(6a) 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 – 1 + 𝜃𝜃1 (𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 – 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 )– 𝜃𝜃2 (𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 – 1 – 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 2 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 – 1 ),

(6b) 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡∗ – 1 + 𝜃𝜃1∗ (𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∗ )– 𝜃𝜃2∗ (𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡∗ – 1 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 2 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡∗ – 1 ) + 𝜃𝜃3∗ (𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 – 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 ),

where foreign variables and policy parameters are asterisked and domestic variables and policy
parameters are nonasterisked, and 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 is the log of the price level, 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 is the log of the exchange rate,
computed in terms of units of domestic currency, 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 is the log of real output, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 is the nominal interest
rate, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 is the log of the nominal money stock, 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 + 𝑗𝑗 is the expectation operator, conditioned on
information dated time 𝑡𝑡 + 𝑗𝑗, 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 is a nominal spending disturbance, with 𝐸𝐸(𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 ) = 0 and 𝐸𝐸(𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡2 ) = 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 ,
and 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 is a money demand disturbance, with 𝐸𝐸(𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 ) = 0 and 𝐸𝐸(𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡2 ) = 𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉2 . All disturbances are
assumed to be independently distributed and serially uncorrelated.
Equations (1) are consumer price indexes for the two economies, where 𝛼𝛼 is the weight of home goods
in consumption in each nation. Equation (2a) is the domestic income-expenditure equilibrium
condition, in which desired expenditures on domestic goods depend positively on foreign income,
negatively on the real interest rate, calculated in terms of the domestic CPI, and positively on the real
exchange rate, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 – 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 . Equation (2b) is the analogous relationship for the foreign economy, in
which foreign desired expenditures depend negatively on the real exchange rate.
Equations (3) express the demands for real money balances in the two economies, where a unitary
income elasticity is a simplifying assumption that does not affect our basic conclusions. Uncovered
interest parity is assumed to hold and is expressed in equation (4). Equations (5) are the aggregate
supply schedules, which, following the approach outlined in Bryson et al. (1998), are derived in the
Appendix under three key assumptions. First, we assume that firms in each nation produce all output
at home for sale at home prices and use only home labor, which is not a mobile factor of production
internationally. As a result, firms value the real wage that they pay their workers in terms of the home
price level. Second, workers in each country can purchase the outputs of both countries This means
that, as in the small-open-economy model of Benavie and Froyen (1992), workers value the real wage
that they earn in terms of the CPI. Third, we assume that the real wage elasticities of labor supply
equal zero in both countries. This permits us to abstract from effects that changes in the expected real
exchange rate otherwise would have on output supply. Although this assumption does not affect our
basic results, it simplifies the exposition somewhat and, more importantly, allows us to compare our
model and results with others in the literature.
In both (5a) and (5b), 𝛾𝛾 is the degree of nominal wage indexation to unanticipated consumer price
changes, which is assumed to be identical for both countries. Note that if 𝛾𝛾 = 0, which was assumed
to hold in Daniels and VanHoose (1995), then there is no CPI indexation and the amount of output

supplied in each nation depends only on the home price prediction error. If 𝛾𝛾 > 0, then nominal
wages in each country respond to CPI price prediction errors, which causes each nation's aggregate
supply of output to depend on prediction errors of the other nation's price level and the exchange rate.
For 𝛾𝛾 = 1, nominal wages are fully indexed to price changes that were unanticipated when nominal
wage contracts were formulated.

Equations (6) are money supply rules for the central banks. The 𝜃𝜃1 and 𝜃𝜃1∗ parameters are combination
policy parameters, as in Poole (1970). Following Goodfriend (1987), the 𝜃𝜃2 and 𝜃𝜃2∗ parameters indicate
whether the nations' central banks establish stationary paths for their money stocks. If 𝜃𝜃2 = 1 and
𝜃𝜃2∗ = 1, then money stock paths in each nation are stationary. They are nonstationary otherwise,
meaning that the cumulative effects of past central bank efforts to vary their monetary instruments to
stabilize goal variables would necessitate permanent deviations in the time paths of instrument values
from previous trend paths. Earlier considerations of the instrument stationarity issue, which included
Gramlich (1971), Holbrook (1972), and Turnovsky (1974), focused on the potential for "instrument
instability," in which offsetting the cumulative effects of past instrument effects on policy goal
variables would entail increasing variations in the monetary instrument. As we discuss below,
instrument instability would constitute one possible form of monetary non-stationarity, which would
be unstable drift of national money stocks.

Under a flexible exchange rate, the foreign central bank ignores unanticipated changes in the exchange
rate, and so 𝜃𝜃3∗ = 0. In contrast, a fixed-exchange-rate version of the model corresponds to a situation
in which 𝜃𝜃3∗ approaches an infinite value. We consider only these "pure" exchange-rate policies of
flexible or fixed exchange rates and do not treat 𝜃𝜃3∗ as a choice variable that the central banks set
optimally. For analyses of the optimal conditioning of monetary policy on exchange-rate innovations,
see Benavie (1983) and Benavie and Froyen (1992).
Under either exchange-rate regime, the central banks seek to minimize loss functions given by
(7a) 𝐿𝐿 = 𝜅𝜅1 Var[(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 – 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 )– 𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 – 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 )] + 𝜅𝜅2 Var(𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 + 1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 )

(7b) 𝐿𝐿 ∗ = 𝜅𝜅1∗ Var[(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 −1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ )– 𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ )] + 𝜅𝜅2∗ Var(𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗+ 1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ ),

where 𝜅𝜅1 , 𝜅𝜅2 , 𝜅𝜅1∗ and 𝜅𝜅2∗ are positive weights. These policy loss functions are adaptations of those
proposed by Goodfriend in a closed-economy context and used by Daniels and VanHoose in an openeconomy setting. In each nation, the central bank seeks to minimize a two-part objective. The first part
is the variance of a linear combination of unexpected home price changes and unexpected changes in
the home CPI. Based on equations (5), minimizing these variances minimizes the contributions of
unexpected home price and CPI changes to the aggregate supply of output in each country.
Consequently, as in Goodfriend, each central bank desires to accomplish "supply smoothing," because
minimizing the variances of (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 – 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 −1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 ) − 𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ) and of (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ )– 𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ −
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ ) would, from (5), minimize the variances of the nations' output levels (which, in our stylized
model, also correspond to expected squared deviations of national output levels from their fullinformation values). In contrast to Goodfriend, however, the fact that firms compute real wages in
terms of home prices while workers calculate real wages in terms of CPIs implies that supply smoothing
requires minimizing the variance of a linear combination of the home price and the CPI.

As in Goodfriend, the second part of each central bank loss function reflects each central bank's desire
to save private agents the costs that they would need to incur to index financial contracts to protect
themselves against anticipated CPI inflation. Note that for 𝛾𝛾 = 0, these loss functions reduce to those
considered by Daniels and VanHoose.

Naturally, the specific form of these loss functions shapes many of our results. For instance, as Balke
and Emery (1994) have pointed out, somewhat different conclusions would follow if we were to
consider intertemporal smoothing of inflation rates. As in Goodfriend's original analysis, however, the
crucial feature of the loss functions is that they imply that policymakers must confront an
intertemporal tradeoff. This feature of the model thereby forces the monetary authorities to confront
the stationarity issue as they formulate their optimal policies. Nevertheless, as noted by VanHoose
(1989), the loss functions in (7) indicate that the central banks engage in intertemporal price
smoothing on a rolling, period-by-period basis, rather than seeking to minimize the variance of the
price level over an infinite horizon. If central banks actually pursued the latter objective, then the
nonstationary policies that we observe would never be optimal, because they would yield infinite
unconditional variances of prices.

To solve the model, we use equilibrium conditions for the domestic output and money markets and for
the foreign output and money markets to obtain solutions for 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 , 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ , 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 , and 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 . Proposed solutions for
these variables are expressed as linear functions of the lagged money stocks, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 – 1 and 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡∗ – 1 , the
lagged money stock innovations, (𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 – 1 – 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 2 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 −1 ) and (𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡∗ – 1 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−2 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡∗ – 1 ), and the exogenous
domestic and foreign expenditure and money demand shocks. It is then possible to construct fourequation solution systems that may be solved for values of the undetermined coefficients in these
proposed solutions. Using these solutions, we compute reduced-form expressions for price, exchangerate, and CPI prediction errors and for anticipated price inflation, CPI inflation, and exchange-rate
depreciation. These expressions then are substituted into the loss functions in equations (7). Because
this procedure is lengthy and cumbersome, we outline the key steps in a separate appendix that is
available upon request.

3. Optimal Monetary Policies in Alternative Policy Regimes

To determine the broadest possible set of circumstances under which non-stationarity of money and
prices arises from the interactions of interdependent monetary policies, we consider three types of
policy regimes. In the first, the foreign monetary authority fixes its country's exchange rate, and both
nations' authorities conduct uncoordinated policies. In the second, the foreign authority permits its
nation's exchange rate to float, and the two authorities again do not coordinate their policies. Finally,
we consider the implications of monetary policy coordination with either a fixed or floating exchange
rate.

A Fixed Exchange Rate

In the fixed-exchange-rate version of the model, the foreign monetary authority maintains the
exchange rate peg and adjusts its money stock as needed to keep the exchange rate unchanged at time
𝑡𝑡, so that 𝜃𝜃3∗ approaches infinity. In this policy regime, the foreign monetary authority eliminates
unanticipated changes in the exchange rate, and so 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 0. The foreign instruments 𝜃𝜃1∗ and
𝜃𝜃2∗ are therefore moot.

This representation of a fixed exchange rate is common in the literature [for instance, see Gros and
Lane (1992) and references therein]. It does not, however, rule out anticipated exchange-rate
depreciation or appreciation. The domestic monetary authority chooses 𝜃𝜃1 and 𝜃𝜃2 to minimize its loss.
Because the domestic authority may pursue a nonstationary monetary policy, the two currencies'
values may diverge from the established parity during time t + 1. This can be seen from the fact that
anticipated currency depreciation is equal to 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 1 – 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = (1 – 𝜃𝜃2 )𝜃𝜃1 (𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 ), which clearly is
equal to zero only if 𝜃𝜃2 = 1, or if the domestic money stock follows a stationary path.

Because the foreign central bank adjusts its money stock endogenously to eliminate exchange-rate
innovations with a fixed exchange rate, 𝜃𝜃1∗ and 𝜃𝜃2∗ are irrelevant parameters for time 𝑡𝑡 outcomes.
Consequently, 𝜃𝜃1∗ and 𝜃𝜃2∗ have no bearing on the variance of unanticipated changes in the foreign price
level and the foreign CPI [the first element of the loss function given in equation (7b)]. This is similar to
the result that arises in Benavie and Froyen's (1988) analysis of a pure nominal-interest-rate peg. In a
closed-economy setting, Benavie and Froyen show that a central bank policy of pegging a nominal
interest rate fails to ensure stationarity of a nation's money stock, because stationarity is irrelevant
when the scope of the policy problem is limited to a single period. If the monetary authorities were
interested only in stabilizing output by minimizing unanticipated price and CPI changes, then the
foreign central bank's pursuit of a fixed exchange rate would, as in Benavie and Froyen's analysis, fail to
tie the foreign money stock to a stationary path. Each period the foreign money stock would adjust as
needed in light of the disturbances that might occur during time 𝑡𝑡. In such a setting with a singleperiod smoothing objective and a fixed exchange rate, the stationarity of the foreign money stock
would be a non-issue.
In our model, however, because both central banks are concerned as well about the variances of
anticipated CPI inflation rates, there is an intertemporal objective. Nonstationary paths for national
money stocks would induce anticipated CPI inflation volatility, and so monetary stationarity (or lack
thereof) is a relevant issue. Specifically, the setting of 𝜃𝜃1∗ and 𝜃𝜃2∗ matters to the foreign authority,
because these policy parameters influence the magnitude of 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗+ 1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ ). The conclusion
that exchange-rate pegging with intertemporal objectives makes stationarity a relevant issue is
analogous to that reached by Goodfriend and by Cover and Schutte (1990) in the case of interest-rate
pegging.
We consider the domestic country first and begin by solving the model for the variance of
(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 – 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 )– 𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 – 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ), which is equal to

(8) Var[(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 – 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 )– 𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 – 1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 )] = 𝜙𝜙3−2 �(𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾7 – 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝜙𝜙1 𝐴𝐴)2 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 + (𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾8 – 𝛽𝛽2 +
2
𝜙𝜙2 𝐴𝐴)2 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂∗
+ 𝜙𝜙32 𝐴𝐴2 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2 �,
where

𝐴𝐴 ≡ (𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2 )𝑑𝑑1 Γ (1 − 𝛾𝛾)Δ−1
1 ,

Δ1 ≡ (𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2 )𝑑𝑑1 Γ(1 + 𝛽𝛽4 − 𝛽𝛽5 ) + (𝜃𝜃1 + 𝑏𝑏)(𝛽𝛽12 + 𝛽𝛽22 ),
Γ ≡ 1 − 𝜃𝜃1 (1 − 𝜃𝜃2 ),

𝜙𝜙1 ≡ 𝛽𝛽1(1 + 𝛽𝛽4 ) − 𝛽𝛽2 𝛽𝛽5 ,

𝜙𝜙2 ≡ 𝛽𝛽2 (1 + 𝛽𝛽4 ) − 𝛽𝛽1 𝛽𝛽5 ,

𝜙𝜙3 ≡ (𝛽𝛽12 − 𝛽𝛽22 ),

𝛽𝛽1 ≡ 𝑎𝑎[(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾) + 𝑐𝑐(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛾𝛾] + 𝑑𝑑1 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑑𝑑2 ,

𝛽𝛽2 ≡ 𝑎𝑎[(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛾𝛾 + 𝑐𝑐(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾)] − 𝑑𝑑1 (1 − 𝛼𝛼) + 𝑑𝑑2 ,
𝛽𝛽3 ≡ 𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(1 + 𝑐𝑐)𝛾𝛾 − 𝑑𝑑1 (1 − 𝛼𝛼) + 𝑑𝑑2 ,
𝛽𝛽4 ≡ 1 + 𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾),

𝛽𝛽5 ≡ 𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛾𝛾,

𝛽𝛽6 ≡ 𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(1 + 𝑐𝑐)𝛾𝛾 + 𝑑𝑑2 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑑𝑑2 ,
𝛽𝛽7 ≡ 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽1 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽2 ,

𝛽𝛽8 ≡ 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽2 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽1 .

−1
2
Minimizing (8) with respect to 𝐴𝐴 then yields 𝐴𝐴̂ = �𝜙𝜙12 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 + 𝜙𝜙22 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂∗
+ 𝜙𝜙32 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀3 � ×
2
�𝜙𝜙1 (𝛽𝛽1 – 𝛽𝛽7 𝛾𝛾)𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2+ 𝜙𝜙2 (𝛽𝛽2 – 𝛽𝛽8 𝛾𝛾)𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂∗
�. In addition, solving for the variance of domestic anticipated
inflation yields
2
(9) Var(𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 + 1 – 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ) = 𝜙𝜙3−2 �(𝜙𝜙1 𝐵𝐵 – 𝛽𝛽7 )2 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 + (𝜙𝜙2 𝐵𝐵 – 𝛽𝛽8 )2 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂∗
𝜙𝜙32 𝐵𝐵 2 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2 �,

�
where 𝐵𝐵 ≡ [𝜙𝜙32 (1 − 𝜃𝜃2 ) 𝜃𝜃1 + (𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2 )𝑑𝑑1 Γ] Δ−1
1 . Minimizing (9) with respect to 𝐵𝐵 yields 𝐵𝐵 =
2
2
(𝜙𝜙12 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 + 𝜙𝜙22 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂∗
+ 𝜙𝜙32 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2 )−1 (𝜙𝜙1 𝛽𝛽7 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 + 𝜙𝜙2 𝛽𝛽8 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂∗
). Setting 𝐴𝐴 = 𝐴𝐴̂ and 𝐵𝐵 = 𝐵𝐵� and solving
jointly for 𝜃𝜃1 and 𝜃𝜃2 then produces the following solution for the optimal setting for 𝜃𝜃2 (the solution for
the optimal value for 𝜃𝜃1 is an even more lengthy expression that we do not report here but which is
provided in the mathematical appendix):
2
(10) 𝜃𝜃�2 = 1 − (𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛽𝛽2 )𝑑𝑑1 (1 − 𝛼𝛼)�𝜙𝜙1 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 + 𝜙𝜙2 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂∗
� × ��(𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛽𝛽2 )�𝜙𝜙1 (𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛽𝛽7 𝛾𝛾)𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 −
2
2
𝜙𝜙2 (𝛽𝛽2 − 𝛽𝛽8 𝛾𝛾)𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂∗
� − (𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛽𝛽2 )𝑑𝑑1 (1 − 𝛼𝛼)�𝜙𝜙1 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 + 𝜙𝜙2 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂∗
��𝑏𝑏 − �{(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝜙𝜙1 − [2 + 𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝛾𝛾)](𝛽𝛽1 −
2
𝛽𝛽7 𝛾𝛾)}𝜙𝜙1 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 + {(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝜙𝜙2 + [2 + 𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝛾𝛾)](𝛽𝛽2 − 𝛽𝛽8 𝛾𝛾)}𝜙𝜙2 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂∗
+ (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝜙𝜙32 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2 �� − 1.

Hence, 𝜃𝜃2 ≠ 1, and so it is optimal for the domestic money stock to follow a non-stationary path. The
reason is that the domestic authority must minimize a weighted sum of domestic price, foreign price,
and exchange rate prediction errors if it is to smooth output; in addition, the domestic authority
simultaneously seeks to minimize anticipated domestic CPI inflation. But the authority has only two
instruments that it may aim independently at these various components of its loss function. This
requires sacrificing stationarity of money and prices.
The variance of foreign anticipated inflation is
(11) Var(𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗+ 1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ ) = [𝜙𝜙3 𝑑𝑑1 (1 − 𝛾𝛾)]−2 �[𝑑𝑑1 (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝛽𝛽7 − 𝜓𝜓 ∗ 𝜙𝜙2 𝐴𝐴]2 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 + [𝑑𝑑1 (1 −
2
𝛾𝛾)𝛽𝛽8 – 𝜓𝜓 ∗ 𝜙𝜙1 𝐴𝐴]2 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂∗
+ (𝜓𝜓 ∗ )2 𝜙𝜙32 𝐴𝐴2 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2 �,

where 𝜓𝜓 ∗ ≡ (Γ ∗ ) − 1[𝑑𝑑1 (𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛽𝛽2 − 𝑑𝑑1 )𝜃𝜃1∗ (1 − 𝜃𝜃2∗ )] and 𝛤𝛤 ∗≡ 1 − 𝜃𝜃1∗ (1 − 𝜃𝜃2∗ ). Minimizing (11) with
2
respect to 𝜓𝜓 ∗ then yields 𝜓𝜓 ∗ = [𝜙𝜙1 (𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛽𝛽7 𝛾𝛾)𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2+ 𝜙𝜙2 (𝛽𝛽2 − 𝛽𝛽8 𝛾𝛾)𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2∗ ]−1 𝑑𝑑1 (1 − 𝛾𝛾)(𝜙𝜙1 𝛽𝛽7 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂∗
+ 𝜙𝜙2 𝛽𝛽8 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 ).
Setting 𝜓𝜓 ∗ = 𝜓𝜓� ∗ and using the solution for A implies that 𝜃𝜃1∗ and 𝜃𝜃2∗ must satisfy
(12) 𝜃𝜃�1∗ �1 − 𝜃𝜃�2∗ � = 𝑑𝑑1 �𝜙𝜙1 (𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽8 )𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 + 𝜙𝜙2 (𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽7 )𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2∗ � × �𝑑𝑑1 �𝜙𝜙1 (𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽8 )𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 + 𝜙𝜙2 (𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽7 )𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2∗ � +
−1

(𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛽𝛽2 )�𝜙𝜙1 (𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛽𝛽7 𝛾𝛾)𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2∗ + 𝜙𝜙2 (𝛽𝛽2 − 𝛽𝛽8 𝛾𝛾)𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 �� .

The foreign monetary authority cannot influence the variance of the foreign price prediction error
under a fixed exchange rate, and so both 𝜃𝜃1∗ and 𝜃𝜃2∗ are available to minimize the variance of
anticipated inflation. Consequently, equation (12) gives a locus of combinations of the two instruments
that is consistent with this objective. Clearly, 𝜃𝜃�2 = 1 is not on this locus. It follows that money and
price-level non-stationarity is optimal as well for the foreign monetary authority.
It can be shown that the solutions for the optimal values of 𝜃𝜃2 and 𝜃𝜃2∗ can assume values below unity
for various ranges of parameter values. As emphasized by Hetzel (1995), optimal values of 𝜃𝜃2 and
𝜃𝜃2∗ that lie below one imply the sort of "bygones" base drift that typically occurs, in which monetary
and price-level increases induced by random shocks permanently shift money and prices on to new,
higher trend paths. As Hetzel has noted, the frameworks examined by Goodfriend and Barro and, in all
but one case, by VanHoose yield "pay-later" drift of money and prices. This form of drift, rarely
observed since the end of the gold standard, entails more-than-offsetting reductions in money and
prices in a subsequent period following contemporaneous increases in money and prices. Pay-later
base drift also can, if optimal values of 𝜃𝜃2 or 𝜃𝜃2∗ exceed two, yield a policy setting that entails
instrument instability.

Hetzel corrected this failing of earlier published work on the stationarity issue by considering a
downward-sloping IS schedule, as opposed to the horizontal IS schedule (Fisher equation) of
Goodfriend. This alteration of Goodfriend's model endogenizes the real interest rate, thereby reducing
the extent of subsequent money-stock adjustment following a contemporaneous price-level change.
Therefore, "bygones" base drift is an optimal policy response in Hetzel's model.

Our framework, as well as the narrower model considered in Daniels and VanHoose (1995), also
produces "bygones" base drift as a possible policy outcome. There are two reasons for this. One is that,
like Hetzel, these models include a downward-sloping IS schedule. Consequently, the real interest rates
in both countries are endogenous "shock absorbers" that give the central banks increased flexibility in
determining the optimal intertemporal paths of money and prices. Another reason, however, is that
the real exchange rate performs an analogous role in the two-country setting. This also reduces the
extent to which the central banks are constrained in their ability to adjust the money and price paths in
an effort to smooth prices across both periods. For instance, substituting the definitions of the 𝛽𝛽
coefficients in equation (12) indicates that for 𝜃𝜃1∗ > 0, 𝜃𝜃2∗ < 1 holds for greater ranges of parameter
values as 𝑑𝑑2 , the parameter governing the sensitivity of expenditures to real-exchange-rate variations,
increases in magnitude. Consequently, monetary policy responses to disturbance-induced interest-rate
innovations have stronger effects, via endogenous responses in the real exchange rate, thereby
enhancing the potential for such policy responses to stabilize output and anticipated CPI inflation. This
gives the foreign monetary authority the flexibility to follow a policy of bygones drift as it pursues it
multipart objective.

A Floating Exchange Rate

In this section, we consider the floating-exchange-rate version of the model, in which 𝜃𝜃3∗ is equal to
zero. Conducting policy analysis in this version of the model is very cumbersome, because endogenous
variations in the exchange rate enlarge the scope for feedback effects between the two economies.
Daniels and VanHoose (1995) computed reduced-form solutions for all four policy parameters under
the restrictive assumptions 𝛾𝛾 = 𝑑𝑑2 = 𝑎𝑎 = 0 and 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 = 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡∗ = 0, and they verified that both 𝜃𝜃2 and 𝜃𝜃2∗ are
not equal to one for this special case of the model. Here, we consider 𝛾𝛾, 𝑑𝑑2 , and a as nonzero but
2
= 𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉2 . Therefore, these
model asymmetric shocks as 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡∗ = −𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 and 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡∗ = −𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 , with 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2∗ = 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 and 𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉∗
disturbances represent relative shifts in relative goods and money demands, respectively. In this
situation, both central banks make identical parameter choices to smooth supply and anticipated CPI
inflation, and so 𝜃𝜃1 = 𝜃𝜃1∗ and 𝜃𝜃2 = 𝜃𝜃2∗ .
Here, the variance of (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 ) − 𝛾𝛾(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ), which is relevant for domestic output
smoothing, is equal to
2 2
2 2
(13) Var[(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 ) − 𝛾𝛾(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 )] = 𝜆𝜆−2
3 ]{𝐴𝐴𝜆𝜆1 − [1 − 𝛾𝛾(2𝛼𝛼 − 1)]} 𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉 + 𝐴𝐴 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂 ,

and the variance of domestic anticipated inflation is given by
𝑐𝑐
2 2
2 2
(14) Var(𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1
− 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ) = 𝜆𝜆−2
3 [𝐵𝐵𝜆𝜆1 + 2(1 − 𝛼𝛼)] 𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉 + 𝐵𝐵 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂 ,

where, for this policy problem, we define 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐵𝐵 as 𝐴𝐴 ≡ Δ−1
2 {[1 − 𝛾𝛾(2𝛼𝛼 − 1)](𝜃𝜃1 + 𝑏𝑏) + 2𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝛼𝛼)}
−1
and 𝐵𝐵 ≡ Δ2 ((2𝛼𝛼 − 1){[1 − 𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝛾𝛾)]𝜃𝜃1 (1 − 𝜃𝜃2 ) − (𝜃𝜃1 + 𝑏𝑏)} + 2(1 + 𝛼𝛼)(1 + 𝑎𝑎)), and
Δ2 ≡ 𝜆𝜆1 [(𝜃𝜃1 + 𝑏𝑏) − 2𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝛼𝛼)Γ + 𝜆𝜆2 𝜆𝜆3 ],

𝜆𝜆1 ≡ 𝑎𝑎(1 + 𝑐𝑐)[1 − 𝛾𝛾(2𝛼𝛼 − 1)] + 𝑑𝑑1 (2𝛼𝛼 − 1̇ ) + 2𝑑𝑑2
𝜆𝜆2 ≡ 𝑑𝑑1 (2𝛼𝛼 − 1) + 2[𝑎𝑎(1 + 𝑐𝑐)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛾𝛾 + 𝑑𝑑2 ],
𝜆𝜆3 ≡ (1 + 𝑎𝑎) − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(2𝛼𝛼 − 1).

Minimizing (13) with respect to 𝐴𝐴 yields 𝐴𝐴̂ = (𝜆𝜆23 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 + 𝜆𝜆12 𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉2 )−1 [1 − 𝛾𝛾(2𝛼𝛼 − 1)]2 𝜆𝜆1 𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉2 , and minimizing
(14) with respect to 𝐵𝐵 yields 𝐵𝐵� = (𝜆𝜆23 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 + 𝜆𝜆12 𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉2 ) − 1[(2𝛼𝛼 − 1)𝜆𝜆1 𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉2 . Setting 𝐴𝐴 = 𝐴𝐴̂ and 𝐵𝐵 = 𝐵𝐵�

produces the following solution for the optimal value of 𝜃𝜃2 :

(15) 𝜃𝜃�2 = 𝜃𝜃�2∗ = 1 − ((2𝛼𝛼 − 1)(1 − 𝛾𝛾){𝜆𝜆3 [2𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝛼𝛼) + (2𝛼𝛼 − 1)(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑏𝑏]𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 − 𝜆𝜆1 (1 − 𝛾𝛾)[𝑑𝑑1 (2𝛼𝛼 −
1) + 2𝑑𝑑2 ]𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉2 })−1 × 2(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝜆𝜆3 (2𝛼𝛼 − 1)(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 .

Hence, with a floating exchange rate non-stationarity is the optimal policy for both central banks. Each
monetary authority seeks to smooth three variables: the home price-prediction error, the home CPIprediction error, and anticipated home CPI inflation. But each authority possesses only two
instruments that it may use independently in an effort to accomplish its three-part objective. For the
domestic central bank, these are its responses to domestic interest-rate innovations (𝜃𝜃1 ) and the
extent to which the path of the domestic money stock departs from its previous trend (implied by the
extent to which 𝜃𝜃2 departs from a value of unity). Because the domestic authority cannot use interestrate responses alone to offset both the variance of domestic price prediction errors and the variance of
domestic CPI prediction errors, it must allow the domestic money stock to depart from its past trend to

induce a change in expectations of expected future prices. This policy mix causes some variability in
anticipated CPI inflation but is consistent with the domestic central bank's overall objective. The same
reasoning applies for the foreign authority.
Note that in our example with relative demand shocks, equation (15) indicates that stationarity is
optimal in the absence of expenditure disturbances (𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 = 0). The reason is that if a positive domestic
money demand disturbance is accompanied by a negative foreign money demand shock of equal
magnitude, then the central banks' optimal interest-rate conditioning of their monetary policies (their
identical choices for 𝜃𝜃1 and 𝜃𝜃1∗ ) entails responding in equal measure, but in opposite directions, to
these diametrically opposed money demand disturbances. With uncovered interest parity, these
interest-rate responses jointly mitigate the effects that such money-market shocks otherwise would
have on price- and CPI-prediction errors. The authorities thereby are free to minimize the variance of
CPI inflation rates via stationary money paths.
Consider the polar case, however, in which there are relative expenditure shocks (𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 > 0) but no
money demand disturbances (𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉2 = 0). With a relative shift in expenditures in favor of the domestic
country (𝜂𝜂∗𝑡𝑡 = −𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 < 0), the real exchange rate will change even though the interest-rate responses of
the authorities' monetary policies stabilize as fully as possible in the face of such shocks. This
adjustment in the real terms of trade induces contemporaneous price-level and CPI innovations that
can be smoothed further only if the central banks depart from stationary paths for money and prices.
Consequently, 𝜃𝜃2 and 𝜃𝜃2∗ are not equal to unity in this case. Indeed, for this special case in which only
relative expenditure shocks occur, bygones drift (𝜃𝜃2 < 1 and 𝜃𝜃2∗ < 1) unambiguously is the optimal
policy.

Monetary Policy Coordination

Would coordination of monetary policies make stationary policies optimal? It is easy, though
cumbersome analytically, to prove that the answer to this question is no. Conceptually, this result is
easy to understand, however. This is particularly true for the fixed-exchange-rate version of the model.
When the foreign monetary authority pegs the exchange rate, it can influence only the variance of
foreign anticipated CPI inflation. At the same time, the variances of domestic price-prediction errors,
CPI-prediction errors, and anticipated CPI inflation and the variances of foreign price- and CPIprediction errors depend only on the domestic policy instruments. As a result, coordination does not
permit the foreign central bank to aim its instruments toward minimizing the domestic loss. Even
though policy coordination expands the number of targets toward which both authorities direct their
instruments, it does not solve the instrument shortage problem that yields monetary and price-level
non-trend-stationarities.
Coordination also fails to overcome the essential instrument shortage problem in the floatingexchange-rate version of the model. If the exchange rate floats, then both policymakers can influence
all components of both domestic and foreign objectives. Nevertheless, each central bank essentially
seeks to minimize the variances of home price prediction errors, home CPI prediction errors, and home
anticipated CPI inflation. This means that there ultimately are a total of six components in the two
authorities' objective functions. Even if the policymakers coordinate by aiming all four instruments (𝜃𝜃1 ,
𝜃𝜃1∗ , and 𝜃𝜃2∗ ) toward minimizing a six-part, joint loss function, the instrument shortage remains even

with a floating exchange rate. The result is base drift and price-level non-trend-stationarity in each
country.

4. Are Base Drift and Price-Level Non-Trend-Stationarity Always Optimal?

Will optimal monetary policymaking in interdependent economies always yield non-stationary paths
for money and prices? Daniels and VanHoose have shown that one policy approach that could
eliminate base drift and price-level non-trend-stationarity entails conditioning home monetary policies
on lagged foreign monetary innovations. If each central bank were to expand its monetary policy rule
in this fashion, it would condition its policy choices on the dynamic behavior of the other nation's
prices, effectively expanding its set of independent policy instruments. The result would be stationarity
of money and prices in both economies with either uncoordinated or coordinated policies.
In the context of the present model, there are only two additional circumstances in which the nations'
money stocks and price levels will be stationary when monetary policies are optimally determined. One
is if we consider the amended loss functions
𝑐𝑐
− 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 )
(7a') 𝐿𝐿 = 𝜅𝜅1 Var(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ) + 𝜅𝜅2 Var(𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1

𝑐𝑐∗
(7b') 𝐿𝐿∗ = 𝜅𝜅1∗ Var(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ ) + 𝜅𝜅2∗ Var(𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1
− 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ )

which imply that the central banks desire to minimize both the variances of CPI prediction errors and
of anticipated CPI inflation. This loss specification is not consistent with an output-smoothing goal in
our model. Nevertheless, equations (7') might be motivated by appealing to a broad central bank
interest in CPI smoothing for its own sake. Alternatively, the loss functions in (7') would be consistent
with a model in which both workers and firms value the real wage in terms of the CPI, so that
minimizing the variance of CPI prediction errors would stabilize output.
In both exchange-rate regimes, following steps analogous to those discussed above yields 𝜃𝜃�2 = 𝜃𝜃�2∗ = 1
as the optimal policy parameter choices. When each central bank aims to smooth only its nation's CPI,
trend-stationarity of money and prices emerges as the optimal policy. The economic intuition behind
this result is straightforward. Under the policy loss functions in equations (7) of the basic model, the
differential computations of real wages by firms and workers cause the supplies of output in each
country to depend on a weighted average of the home price and the CPI. If supply smoothing is the key
justification for the central banks to care about the variance of unexpected price or CPI prediction
errors, then central banks should seek to minimize the variance of an asymmetrical linear combination
of the home price and CPI. This asymmetrical objective yields a shortfall in the number of policy
instruments relative to the effective number of objectives, given that at each central bank there are
three objectives (the variances of unexpected home price prediction errors, of CPI prediction errors,
and of anticipated CPI inflation) but only two independent policy instruments (𝜃𝜃1 and 𝜃𝜃2 in the case of
the domestic central bank and 𝜃𝜃1∗ and 𝜃𝜃2∗ in the case of the foreign central bank and a floating
exchange rate). In turn, this shortage of instruments relative to objectives requires each central bank
to sacrifice the trend-stationarity of money and prices.
In contrast, under the revised loss functions given by equations (7'), both central banks seek to smooth
their nation's CPIs. The resulting symmetry of both parts of their price-smoothing objectives removes
tension between the effective number of objectives and the number of independent policy

instruments. To see this, note that the domestic and foreign losses in (7') ultimately may be rewritten
as 𝐿𝐿 = 𝜅𝜅1 Var(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ) + 𝜅𝜅2 Var[(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ) − (1 − 𝜃𝜃2 )𝜃𝜃1 (𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 )] and 𝐿𝐿∗ =
𝜅𝜅1∗ Var(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ ) + 𝜅𝜅2∗ Var[(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ ) − (1 − 𝜃𝜃2∗ )𝜃𝜃1∗ (𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∗ )]. Clearly, setting 𝜃𝜃2 = 1
and 𝜃𝜃2∗ = 1 eliminates the distinction between the objectives of minimizing the variance of CPI
prediction errors and the variance of anticipated inflation. The central banks then may set 𝜃𝜃1 and 𝜃𝜃1∗ so
as to minimize the variances of CPI prediction errors.
The loss functions in equations (7) are appropriate for a setting, such as that captured by our model, in
which international integration of national economies is sufficiently incomplete that home firms value
real wages in terms of home prices. Although the world economy certainly has become more
integrated in recent years, the degrees of factor mobility and output-market integration that would
induce central banks to adopt the symmetrical, CPI-based objectives in equations (7') have not yet
been achieved.
A second circumstance under which stationary paths for money stocks and price levels would be
optimal in our model is if we introduce sufficient symmetries into our framework. For instance,
consider the case in which 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 and 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡, with 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2∗ = 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 and 𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉2∗ = 𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉2 , so that both expenditure
and money demand disturbances are common world shocks. In this case, if we use the general
objective functions given by equations (7), then the optimal policy settings for the central banks are
𝜃𝜃2 = 𝜃𝜃2∗ = 1. The reason is that, because both countries are identical, optimal policy responses to
common shocks are identical. Furthermore, these responses tend to stabilize both nations' prices, so
that policy actions by each authority benefit both nations simultaneously. Essentially, if such complete
symmetry exists, then the two countries in our framework effectively function as a closed-economy
system that actions of the monetary authorities stabilize, whether or not they are coordinated.
Therefore, our framework indicates that nonstationary paths for money and prices are likely to be the
optimal coordinated or uncoordinated policies for central banks in nations that have imperfectly
integrated output markets and that experience asymmetric disturbances. This conclusion follows
whether or not such nations fix their exchange rates. Because incomplete market integration and
country-specific disturbances characterize modern economies, our conclusion is that base drift and
price-level non-trend-stationarities are unavoidable by-products in an international setting.
Throughout, we have considered only pure exchange-rate policies for both authorities. A natural
question concerns how our results might be affected by considering the optimal determination of
𝜃𝜃3∗ and adding an analogous 𝜃𝜃3 parameter to the domestic authority's policy rule. On the surface, it
seems that this might expand the menu of available policy instruments, thereby overcoming the
instrument shortage problem that the authorities face. In fact, however, we would obtain the same
general results, though different final-form solutions, in the context of our model. With uncovered
interest parity, once the authorities have conditioned their policies on the information content of
home interest-rate innovations by choosing 𝜃𝜃1 and 𝜃𝜃1∗ optimally, there is no policy gain that may be
achieved by conditioning their policies on exchange-rate innovations. In other words, additional 𝜃𝜃3 and
𝜃𝜃3∗ parameters would be redundant policy parameters if uncovered interest parity holds, as it does in
the present framework.

This reasoning suggests that in a setting in which uncovered interest parity does not apply,
conditioning monetary policy on exchange-rate innovations may permit central banks to pursue
stationary policies. In such an environment, 𝜃𝜃3 and 𝜃𝜃3∗ parameters could be aimed independently at the
policy objectives, mitigating the instrument shortage. Exploring this possibility could prove fruitful, but
it is beyond the bounds of our framework.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we have shown that in an open-economy setting, base drift and price-level non-trendstationarity in general are likely to emerge as optimal monetary policy outcomes. We have
demonstrated that when uncovered interest parity holds and when monetary authorities seek to
smooth the supply of real output, this conclusion follows under either fixed or flexible exchange rates
and with or without monetary policy coordination.
Trend-stationary monetary policies are unambiguously optimal only under two circumstances. One
arises if central banks seek to minimize unanticipated and anticipated variability of their nations' CPIs,
either because the central banks have no interest in output smoothing or because factor markets are
fully integrated, so that CPI smoothing is tantamount to output smoothing. If CPI smoothing is the
objective of central banks, then there is no instrument shortage problem for central banks whether or
not they coordinate their policies. Consequently, their optimal policy choices yield stationary paths for
money and prices. The other circumstance arises if countries experience only common disturbances.
For identical countries, this leads to common policy responses that effectively yield Goodfriend's
closed-economy result that price-level trend-stationarity is the optimal policy.
Throughout the literature, researchers typically hypothesize that central banks in interdependent
economies seek to minimize unanticipated output volatility and variations in anticipated CPI inflation.
This paper has shown that non-trend-stationarity monetary and price paths generally emerge as
optimal policies when central banks in open economies possess these objectives. Furthermore, the
bygones form of base drift actually experienced by many world economies can arise in such a setting,
even if central banks have no ultimate desires to smooth interest rates, exchange rates, or monetary
aggregates.
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Appendix

The aggregate supply functions in equations (5) stem from the following relationships:
(A.1) 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎0 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 ,

∗
𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
= 𝑎𝑎0 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡∗ , 0 < 𝑎𝑎0 < 1 ;

(A.2) 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑 = −𝑎𝑎1 (𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 ), 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡∗𝑑𝑑 = −𝑎𝑎1 (𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ ),
(A.3) 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 = 𝜔𝜔(𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ),

𝑎𝑎1 ≡ (1 − 𝑎𝑎0 ) − 1;

𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡∗𝑠𝑠 = 𝜔𝜔(𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ ), 𝜔𝜔 > 0;

(A.4) 𝑤𝑤
� 𝑡𝑡 = (𝑎𝑎1 + 𝜔𝜔)−1 [(𝑎𝑎1 + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + 𝜔𝜔(1 − 𝑎𝑎)(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 )],

𝑤𝑤
� 𝑡𝑡∗ = (𝑎𝑎1 + 𝜔𝜔)−1 [(𝑎𝑎1 + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)]𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝜔𝜔(1 − 𝑎𝑎)(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 );

(A.5) 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝑤𝑤
� 𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ), 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝑤𝑤
� 𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝛾𝛾(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ );

where 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 denotes the log of employment and wt denotes the log of the nominal wage rate.

Equations (A.1) are firm production functions, and equations (A.2) are the implied labor demand
schedules, in which intercepts are suppressed as an analytical simplification. Equations (A.3) are labor
supply schedules, in which workers compute their real wages in terms of their home CPIs. Equations
(A.4) are the market-clearing, full-information wages, while equations (A.5) are the contract wages.
Equations (5) then follow after substituting the expectations of (A.4) into (A.5), substituting the results
into (A.2) and (A.1), defining 𝑎𝑎 ≡ 𝑎𝑎0 𝑎𝑎1, and considering the limiting case in which to approaches a
value of zero.

